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Abstract 
Non-pharmaceutical interventions have been extensively used worldwide to limit the 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2, but they also place an enormous social and economic burden 
on populations . We report the results of recent mass testing for SARS-CoV-2 in Slovakia 
where rapid antigen tests were used to screen the whole population and to isolate 
infectious cases together with their household members. Prevalence of detected 
infections decreased by  58% (95% CI: 57-58%)  within one week in the 45 counties that 
were subject to two rounds of mass testing. Adjusting for geographical clustering and 
differences in attendance rates and the epidemiological situation at the time of the first 
round, this changed to  61% (95% CI: 50-70%). Adjusting for an estimated growth rate in 
infections of 4.4% (1.1-6.9%) per day in the week preceding the mass testing campaign 
and the corresponding expected growth in infection prevalence, the estimated decrease 
in prevalence compared to a scenario of unmitigated growth was 70% (67-73%). Using a 
microsimulation model  we find that this decrease can not be explained solely by infection 
control measures that were introduced in the weeks preceding the intervention, but 
requires the additional impact of isolation as well as quarantine of household members of 
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Non-pharmaceutical interventions have been extensively used worldwide to limit the 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 ​(​1​–​4 ​)​. These have included travel restrictions, mandating face 
masks, closure of schools and non-essential businesses, and nationwide stay-at-home 
orders. While all the measures were aimed at mitigating ill-health due to COVID-19  ​(​3 ​, ​5​) 
they also place an unprecedented economic and social burden on people ​(​6 ​–​9 ​)​, the 
majority uninfected. Testing of reported symptomatic cases and tracing their contacts 
aims to provide a more targeted measure but in many settings has proven insufficient for 
containing transmission ​(​10 ​, ​11 ​)​. 
 
Mass testing campaigns are an alternative way to identify infectious individuals and allow 
targeting of interventions without much added burden to those uninfectious ​(​12 ​)​. 
However, they have been limited until recently by the dependence on Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (PCR) for the diagnosis of a SARS-CoV-2 infection. While laboratory capacities 
have been upscaled in record time, PCR testing remains expensive and can seldom 
achieve a turnaround time of less than one day ​(​13 ​, ​14 ​)​. In comparison, recently developed 
rapid antigen tests are cheap and can be quickly produced in large quantities offering 
results on site in 15-30 mins without the need for a laboratory.  They are less sensitive in 
detecting infections with low viral load but have been found to detect the vast majority of 
infectious infections, and hence may make mass testing a viable part of the portfolio of 
non-pharmaceutical interventions ​(​15 ​–​17 ​)​.  
 
In October 2020, Slovakia became the first country in the world to use rapid antigen tests 
in a campaign targeting the whole population in order to identify infections at scale, 
rapidly reduce transmission and allow quicker easing of lockdown measures​( ​18 ​)​. A pilot 
took place between 23 and 25 October in the four most affected counties, followed by a 
round of national mass testing on 31 October and 1 November (henceforth: round 1). High 
prevalence counties were again targeted with a subsequent round on 7 and 8 November 
(round 2).   
 
We evaluated the impact of mass testing in Slovakia, in combination with other measures 




In total, 5,276,832 rapid antigen tests were used in the mass testing campaigns, with 65% 
of the respective populations tested in the pilot, 66% in mass testing round 1 and 62% 
round 2. This corresponded to 87%, 83% and 84% of the age-eligible population in each 
round, respectively, and does not include another 534,300 tests that were conducted 
through additional testing sites for medical, military and governmental personnel and not 
included in geographical county data.  
A total of 50,466 tests indicated the presence of a currently infectious SARS-CoV-2 
infection. The proportion of positive tests was 3.91% (range across counties: 3.12 to 
4.84%) in the pilot, 1.01% (range: 0.13-3.22%) in round 1 and 0.62% (range: 0.28-1.65%) in 
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round 2 (Figure 2C and D). We estimate that with 95% certainty the specificity of the SD 
Biosensor Standard Q antigen test was exceeding 99.85%. 
In the four counties where the pilot was conducted, prevalence decreased by 56% (95% 
Confidence Interval, CI: 54-58%) between the pilot and round 1 of the mass testing 
campaign and a further 60% (95% CI: 56-63%) between rounds 1 and 2, totalling a 
decrease of 82% (95% CI: 81-83%) over two weeks. There was little heterogeneity between 
counties (Figure 2B).  
Among the 45 counties that were included in round 2 of the mass testing campaign, 
infection prevalence decreased by 58% (95% CI: 57-58%) in the crude analysis and by 61% 
(95% CI: 50-70%) if adjusted for differences in region, attendance rates, reproduction 
number and round 1 prevalence.  The estimated reduction varied by county from 29% in 
county Považská Bystrica to 79% in county Medzilaborce but with little regional 
differences (Figure 2A). Neither region, attendance rates, prevalence in round 1 or the 
estimated growth rate prior to mass testing were found to be significantly associated with 
county specific reductions. 
At the time of round 1 of the mass testing campaign incidence of confirmed cases was 
rising in non-pilot counties with an estimated infection growth rate of 4.4% (1.1%-6.9%) 
per day. When adjusting for this growth trend, we estimated a self-adjusted prevalence 
ratio (saPR) of 0.30 (0.27-0.33) . In the pilot counties, reported infection incidence showed 
signs of levelling in the week before the mass testing campaign with an estimated 
infection growth rate of 1.3% (-7.4-7.8%), yielding a respective saPR of 0.31 (0.26-0.33). 
In a microsimulation model, only the scenario that assumed a substantial impact of both 
the lockdown and the mass testing was able to generate reductions in test positivity rates 
between testing rounds that were similar to those observed (Figure 3). The requirement 
for quarantine for the whole household following a positive test was essential for the 
effect of mass testing; predicted prevalence ratio between the first two testing rounds of 




The reduction in prevalence achieved in Slovakia through a combination of restrictions on 
movement and the first ever large scale rapid antigen mass testing is striking, with 
reductions of over 50% achieved within a week between two rounds of testing. While we 
could not with certainty disentangle the effects, simulations from a mathematical model 
suggested that both the restrictions and mass testing likely contributed substantially to 
the observed impact and that quarantining of household contacts was a crucial 
contribution to the effectiveness of mass testing.  
Potentially large numbers of false positive tests have been a point of criticism for mass 
testing campaigns. While multiple studies have found high specificity of the Biosensor test 
kit they are not powered to exclude specificity levels that on population level would yield 
an overwhelming amount of false positives ​(​15​, ​22 ​)​. We show that indeed specificity is very 
likely exceeding 99.85% and therefore not of major concern in this study. 
While we observed a dramatic reduction in test positivity between mass testing 
campaigns, the observed change in daily case incidence reported through standard 
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surveillance was not the rapid collapse in test-positive cases that would correspond to the 
drastic reductions in prevalence. This may be due to a variety of reasons. Foremost, 
national mass testing campaigns are likely to have a major disruptive effect on passive 
syndromic surveillance. In addition, starting mid-September the incidence surveillance 
has been operating at capacity with long waiting lists for testing and stricter eligibility 
criteria, which in the post mass testing period reduced substantially, and hence may have 
artificially reduced the observable change in such data. In contrast, data on hospital bed 
occupancy shows sudden flattening from mid-November suggesting a sharp decrease in 
new admissions consistent with a sizable reduction in new infections at the time of the 
mass testing campaigns (Figure S6). 
 
The most important limitation of this observational study is that we were unable to clearly 
distinguish the effect of the mass testing campaigns from that of the other 
non-pharmaceutical interventions introduced at a similar time, that have led to a 
reduction in contacts and mobility, albeit much less than during the Spring lockdown 
(Figure S4). We are unaware of any other context in which a COVID-19 intervention has 
resulted in a 60% decline in infection prevalence within one week (or 80% in two weeks), 
particularly while primary schools and workplaces were mostly open. This would suggest 
that indeed a large share of the impact can be attributed to the mass testing campaigns. 
Similarly, our analysis using mathematical modelling suggests that even with what would 
be considered as one of the most impactful lockdowns observed so far, it would be 
impossible to replicate such rapid drop in test positivity without a substantial 
contribution from the mass testing campaign.  
 
The need to mobilise sufficient medical personnel to conduct the nasopharyngeal swabs 
could be a major obstacle to countries. Other rapid antigen tests kits are available that 
have achieved similarly high sensitivity in detecting likely infectious infections in lab 
conditions but are also licensed for use with nasal swabs ​(​32​, ​33 ​)​. Nasal swabs can be 
self-administered and therefore reduce demand on trained personnel and transmission 
risk in the process of sample collection or even may enable testing at home. However, 
these benefits have to be carefully weighed against the potential loss of sensitivity if self 
administered ​(​34 ​)​.  
 
In conclusion, the combination of nationwide restrictions and mass testing with 
quarantining of household contacts of test positives rapidly reduced the prevalence of 
infectious residents in Slovakia. While impossible to disentangle the precise contribution 
of control measures and mass testing, the latter is likely to have had a substantial effect in 




Slovakia is a country with a population of 5.5 million, consisting of 79 counties grouped 
into 8 administrative regions. Slovak residents aged between 10 and 65 years and older 
adults in employment were eligible for mass testing (about 4 million people). Those 
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quarantining at the time or who had recovered from COVID-19 in the past three months 
were excluded. 
The pilot was conducted in three counties in the Orava subregion (Námestovo, Tvrdošín, 
Dolný Kubín) and Bardejov county, which had the highest infection incidence at the time. 
The first round of mass testing was conducted nation-wide and the second round of mass 
testing was restricted to 45 counties, mostly in the northern part of Slovakia, with 
infection prevalence in the first mass testing round exceeding 7 per 1,000 tests.  
 
Interventions 
Slovakia implemented a series of  infection control measures throughout  October, which 
included closing schools for pupils aged 14 or above on 15 Oct and for pupils aged 10 and 
above on 26 October. They remained closed throughout the period of the mass testing 
campaigns and thereafter. Indoor gastronomy and indoor leisure activities were also 
restricted. Residents were further asked to limit their movement for one week between 24 
October and 1 November only to: going to work, taking children to school, shopping for 
essential items and going for recreational walks (Figures 1 and S4). Although these rules 
were legally enforceable, Slovakia relied mostly on people’s civil responsibility to adhere 
to restrictions. 
On the days of mass testing, participants attended testing centres run by healthcare                         
professionals, armed forces and volunteers. Overall, Slovakia deployed around twenty                   
thousand medical staff and forty thousand non-medical personnel. Testing procedures                   
followed as recommended by the manufacturer, with nasopharyngeal samples obtained                   
by trained medical personnel using flexible, aluminum-shaft, calcium alginate swabs ​(​19 ​)​.  
Testing was not obligatory, but residents who did not attend the mass testing were                           
instructed to stay home for ten days or until the next round of mass testing. A medical                                 
certificate was issued to every participant confirming their infection status. A                     
test-negative certificate was required by employers to enter workplaces. Various venues                     
and public institutions inspected peoples’ certificates at random. Private PCR tests were                       
also accepted if no older than the most recent mass testing campaign. Citizens whose test                             
results were positive were asked to enter a 10-day long quarantine together with all                           
members of the same household and their self-traced contacts in the preceding two days                           
in an attempt to reduce secondary transmission.  
 
Data 
No participant information was collected during either of the mass-testing campaigns. 
However, information on the number of tests used as well as the number of positive tests 
has been tracked and made openly available by the Slovak Government ​( ​18 ​)​. The SD 
Biosensor Standard Q antigen test that was used exclusively has high specificity, with 
point estimates typically in excess of 99.5%.  Sensitivity exceeded 70% in most validation 
studies, and exceeded 90% among samples with a cycle threshold below 25, a threshold 
commonly associated with effective transmission ​(​15 ​, ​20 ​–​22 ​)​.  
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To assess trends in the local epidemiology of SARS-CoV we used routine syndromic and 
PCR confirmed surveillance for the daily incidence of infections as reported by the Slovak 
Ministry of Health ​(​23​)​. 
 
Analyses 
We calculated crude prevalence ratios (cPR) to estimate the change in test positivity 
between mass testing campaigns, including Wald-Normal confidence intervals. Binomial 
confidence intervals were calculated for prevalence estimates. Test positive rates provide 
a natural upper bound for false positive rates of a test. We thus estimated the minimum 
test specificity ​ms​ as the probability of observing a test positivity of at least 1-​ms ​ in at least 
one county, assuming the test positivity to be binomially distributed. 
To explore heterogeneity between counties in the estimated reduction in test positivity in 
subsequent rounds of mass testing, we used a quasi-Poisson regression model. The 
number of positive tests in each county was modelled with a county specific intercept, an 
indicator variable for the round 2 of mass testing, and interactions of the latter with 
attendance rates in round 1, round 1 test positivity, the reproduction number leading up 
to round 1 and region as covariates as well as the log number of tests as an offset variable. 
The three continuous variable interaction terms were centered and standardised (see 
supplement).  
We used the EpiNow2 model ​(​24 ​, ​25 ​)​ for the calculation of trends in local epidemiology 
prior to mass testing based on routinely reported infection incidence. EpiNow2 uses 
observed delay distributions in combination with a renewal equation model to 
probabilistically infer the infection date for each reported case as well as the 
population-wide time varying reproduction number ​( ​26​–​28 ​)​ , allowing a smoothed 
extrapolation of infection incidence and prevalence and extrapolation beyond the 
observed study period under an assumption of no change.  We define the self-adjusted 
prevalence ratio (saPR) as the cPR divided by the prevalence ratio at the times of  round 2 
vs round 1 as estimated through EpiNow2. The saPR is an estimate for the effect of the 
intervention that takes into account that infection prevalence would have changed in the 
time between observations (see supplement). 
To explore scenarios for the relative effect of mass testing and lockdown we used a 
microsimulation model. We focused on three scenarios in which mass testing takes place, 
i) an epidemic growth rate of R​e​=1.4 (as in early October) that is unchanged by lockdown 
measures, ii) a reduced growth rate of R​e​=1 from 15​th​ October (similar to many parts of 
Europe in the weeks following autumn lockdowns) and iii) the growth rate reduced to 
R​e​=0.6  from 15​th​ October (the smallest observed reproduction number nationally during 
the COVID-19 pandemic) but no effect of mass testing. A detailed model description is 
provided in the supplementary material, but in brief: Individuals are grouped in 
households according to Slovak census data ​( ​29 ​)​,  and make contact with individuals 
outside their household at age-specific rates​(​30​)​. To account for social distance measures, 
we assumed absence of at-school contacts for children 10 years and over, and that 
contacts at work and contacts not at the home, school, or workplace, were reduced by 
25% and 75% from pre-epidemic levels, respectively. We simulated infections among 
78,000 susceptible individuals, representative of the population size of a typical pilot 
county. When infection prevalence reached 3.2% (approximating a typical observed 
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prevalence during the testing pilot), up to 3 rounds of weekly mass testing were initiated 
and the week before that restrictions equivalent to those enacted in Slovakia were 
implemented. In the model, we assumed perfect test sensitivity for detection of currently 
infectious infections, specificity, and compliance with quarantine. Observed test 




Daily incidence of positive COVID-19 test reports and the results of the mass testing are 
available through governmental websites ​(​18​, ​23 ​)​. All analyses were conducted in R ​(​31 ​) 
and can be found at ​www.github.com/sbfnk/covid19.slovakia.mass.testing ​  (data 
analyses) and ​https://github.com/kevinvzandvoort/covid_svk​ (simulation model). 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1:​ Overview of county specific test numbers and reductions for the 79 counties in Slovakia. R: median 
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Figure 1: Overview of interventions and pre mass testing epidemiology. ​Top panel: description of timing 
and extent of national contact restriction in Slovakia (color intensity indicates intensity of the measures) and 
timing and extent of the mass testing campaigns. Dots and lines in respective colors show the start and 
duration of the contact restrictions and the blue dots show the days on which mass testing was conducted, 
though the highest turnout was usually on the first day. The additional box illustrates contact reducing 
measures for test positives and those who did chose not to get tested. Bottom panel: SARS-CoV-2 infection 
incidence as reported by the Slovak Ministry of Health and collected through passive symptom triggered 
PCR testing. Using the same color coding as in the top panel contact interventions are displayed by 
horizontal and mass testing campaigns by vertical lines. Data following the respective first mass testing 
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Figure 2: The change in test positivity between mass testing campaigns​. Panel A: change in test 
positivity (1 - cPR) observed from mass testing round 1 to round 2 in the 45 counties that were eligible for 
both rounds of mass testing. Counties are grouped and color coded into regions. The crude pooled estimate 
and its 95% confidence bounds are shown as red vertical lines. Panel B: change in test positivity (1 - cPR) 
observed from the pilot mass testing round to either the first (green) or the second (orange) national round 
and from the first to the second mass testing round (blue) in the 4 counties that were included in the pilot. 
Panel C and D: county level test positivity in the first (C) and second (D) round of mass testing. Grey areas 
indicate counties that were not part of the second round because their test positivity rate was less than 7 per 
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Figure 3: Simulated relative effectiveness of the lockdown and the mass testing. ​Top panel: the change 
in prevalence of infectious non-quarantining individuals between 10 and 65 years of age as predicted by the 
microsimulation model. For comparison the observed test-positivity rate is shown in blue. The facets show 
changes from the pilot to the first round of mass testing (left) and from the pilot to the second round of mass 
testing (right). Shown scenarios compare the effect of (top to bottom) no additional interventions that limit 
the growth rate of R​e​=1.4, the national lockdown drastically reducing the growth rate to R​e​=0.6 and no mass 
testing being conducted, the national lockdown reducing the growth rate to R​e​=1.0 and no mass testing 
being conducted,  no change in growth rate but mass testing, and the national lockdown reducing the 
growth rate to R​e​=1 and mass testing. Bottom panel: Simulated infection incidence of alternative 
intervention strategies. Simulations are aligned by the date of the first mass test (t=0). The dashed line 
indicates the timing of the lockdown and the solid lines the timing of the mass testing campaigns. Colors 
indicate the simulations stratified into whether no mass testing or 1, 2 or 3 testing rounds were performed 
and the effectiveness of the lockdown measures. Red and yellow dots indicate the prevalence of 
infectiousness observed among the non-quarantining age-eligible population, corresponding to the 
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Supplementary material to “The effectiveness of 
population-wide screening in reducing SARS-CoV-2 infection 
prevalence in Slovakia” 
by Martin Pavelka, Kevin Van-Zandvoort, Katharine Sherratt, Sam Abbott, Marek Majdan,                     
CMMID COVID-19 working group, Pavol Jarčuška, Marek Krajčí ​, Stefan Flasche* ​$​,                     
Sebastian Funk*​$ 
Supplementary Tables and Figures 
Figure S1: Proportion of positive tests​. Test positivity grouped by different mass testing rounds. Given a 
sufficiently large sample size, one minus test specificity would be the lowest observable proportion of 
positive test. The absence of apparent clustering of observations at the lower end of the observed range 
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Figure S2:​ ​Simulated relative effectiveness of the lockdown and the mass testing without adherence 
to quarantine for household members of test-positives. ​The change in prevalence of infectious 
non-quarantining individuals between 10 and 65 years of age as predicted by the microsimulation model. 
For comparison the observed test-positivity rate is shown in light green. The facets show changes from the 
pilot to the first round of mass testing (top) and from the pilot to the second round of mass testing (bottom). 
Shown scenarios compare the effect of (top to bottom) no additional interventions that limit the growth rate 
of R​e​=1.4, the national lockdown drastically reducing the growth rate to R​e​=0.6 and no mass testing being 
conducted, no change in growth rate but mass testing, and the national lockdown substantially reducing the 
growth rate to R​e​=1 and mass testing.  
 
Figure S3: Simulated relative effectiveness of the lockdown and the mass testing over time. ​Simulated 
infection incidence of alternative intervention strategies. Simulations are aligned by the date of the first 
mass test (t=0). The dashed line indicates the timing of the lockdown and the solid lines the timing of the 
mass testing campaigns. Colors indicate the simulations stratified into whether no mass testing or 1, 2 or 3 
testing rounds were performed. In the full household compliance facets all household members quarantine 
for 10 days if a member was tested positive and in the non compliance facet they did not. In Scenario 1 
lockdown had no effect on the reproduction number and in Scenario 2 the reproduction number was 
reduced to 1. The additional grey line in scenario 2 indicates a scenario where no mass testing was done but 
the reproduction number was reduced to 0.6. 
 
 
Figure S4: Google mobility index for Slovakia. ​The change in mobility in comparison to baseline for a 
number of settings during 2020 in Slovakia. The mobility data is as provided by Google 
(​https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/​ ).  
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Figure S5: Comparing the microsimulation model population to observed structures in Slovakia. ​Panel 
A shows the median relative population distribution across all model runs (dark-green) compared to the 
UNWPP population estimates for Slovakia in 2020 (light-green), by age-group. Panel B shows the median 
household contact matrix (left; assuming all household members make one contact per day) compared to 
the synthetic household contact matrix (right), adjusted for UNWPP population size. Panel C  shows the 
median non-household contact matrix (left) compared to the synthetic non-household contact matrix 
(right), adjusted for lockdown measures and UNWPP population size.
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Figure S6: Hospital bed occupancy with COVID-19 patients in Slovakia during the autumn of 2020​. 
Following an increase particularly during October a sharp the abrupt levelling off in the first week of 
November suggests a sharp decrease in new admissions coinciding with the timing of the mass testing. Data 





Additional details for the study 
 
Detailed timeline of  national SARS-CoV-2infection control measures adopted in Slovakia 
Pre - 1 October 
● Compulsory face coverings indoors, in enclosed public places and inside mass 
transport vehicles 
● 1000 limit on number of people in aquaparks 
● 1000 outdoors and 500 indoors limit on mass gatherings 
● Travellers returning from “high risk” countries or regions are requested to take a 
PCR test after the fifth day of their arrival or remain in quarantine for 10 days 
● Shopping hours between 9am and 11am reserved for the elderly 
1 October 
● Gatherings limited to max 50 people 
● Wedding receptions banned 
15 October 
● Gatherings limited to max 6 people (indoors or outdoors) 
● Online schooling for pupils aged 14 years or older 
● Compulsory face coverings including outdoors, if within city limits  
● Wake receptions banned 
● Indoor gastronomy closed 
● Theatres and cinemas closed 
● Pubs, clubs and bars closed 
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● Gyms, swimming pools, aquaparks, spas and other wellness and fitness facilities 
closed 
● Church and religious services suspended 
24 October - 1 November 
● National stay at home order (lockdown) with the following exceptions: 
○ travel to and from place of work 
○ accompanying children to and from school 
○ the first four grades of elementary schools, nurseries and creche stayed 
open 
○ essential travel and activities (i.e. groceries, pharmacy, doctor surgeries, 
caring for a family dependant, animal husbandry, walking pets within 100 
meter distance from home, funerals, post office, bank, insurance company, 
cleaning services, car repair services, petrol stations) 
○ recreational nature walks  
2 November 
● same restrictions as 15 October with the addition of closing school for pupils aged 
10 year or older. 
 
EpiNow2 
We used EpiNow2 to backcalculate infection curves in pilot and non-pilot regions. These 
were converted to infection prevalence using a detection window of 2-6 days after 
exposure. This allowed us to estimate the infection prevalence of reported cases at the 
time of mass testing ( ​p1​) and in the subsequent mass testing round (​p2 ​). Thus we define 
the self adjusted prevalence ratio as the crude prevalence ratio observed in the mass 
testing campaigns adjusted for the predicted change in prevalence if no mass testing or 




We used a quasi Poisson model that was a priori defined by a choice of available 
covariates that could have plausibly altered the observed impact of the intervention: 
 
where  
x = number of positive tests in each county 
N = number of samples 
r = round indicator; 0 for first and 1 for second round 
c​i = county (categorical) 
a​2 = attendance rate of the first national survey (FNS) 
p​2 = prevalence observed in the FNS 
R​2 = net reproduction number estimated from EpiNow2 for the day of the FNS 
g​i = region (categorical) 
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The model was set up to use the county specific intercept to exactly model the test 
positivity observed in the first national testing campaign. The round indicator measures 
the adjusted prevalence ratio (aPR) and the remaining covariates are centered and 
standardised interaction terms with round to estimate the effects of these variables on the 
prevalence ratio between the first and second round of mass testing. The number of tests 




We used an individual-based, probabilistic microsimulation model (IBM) to study the 
expected reduction in prevalence of (detected) infectiousness under different 
assumptions. 
We up our model to represent an average county of Slovakia . 
In our IBM, individuals fall within  age strata (where  is a given age stratum) witha i  
relative proportions . They belong to  households of mean size  (we combinepi mh  
different datasets to simulate a population). The simulation starts when the model 
population of size   is seeded with at least one SARS-CoV-2 infection, and runs for 365N  
days. 
Births, non-COVID-19 deaths, ageing and migration are omitted from the model given its 
short timeframe. The study’s endpoint of interest is infection, we did not include 
hospitalisation or clinical outcome status of cases. Infectiousness is assumed to be 
unaffected by clinical severity, but does differ for asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic and 
symptomatic cases (see below). 
Infection states and transitions 
At any time , individuals  within the IBM are within one of the following classes:  t S
(susceptible), (exposed and latent, i.e. infected but not yet infectious),  (infectiousE IP  
but pre-symptomatic),  (infectious and symptomatic),  (infectious andIC IS  
asymptomatic throughout the infection), or (removed: recovered and assumed to beR  
immune or deceased). The age-specific probability of becoming a symptomatic case when 
infected is  .yi  
Over any   time unit, any given individual  has the following binomial probabilities oftΔ  
transitioning to a subsequent state: 
(S →E )Binomial(1,  )P r x x 1 − e −λi,x,t  
(E →I )Binomial(1, (t )y )P r x P ,x dE E,x i,x  
(E →I )Binomial(1, (t )(1 ))P r x S,x dE E,x − yi,x  
(I →I )Binomial(1, (t ))P r P ,x C,x dP P ,x  
(I →R )Binomial(1, (t ))P r C,x x dC C,x  
(I →R )Binomial(1, (t ))P r S,x x dS S,x  
where   is the age-specific instantaneous force of infection experienced by a 1 − e −λi,x,t  
susceptible individual, as detailed below; and , , , ,  and  are cumulativedE dP dC dS  
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distribution functions (CDFs) for the duration of the corresponding states: (t )dE E,x  
denotes the CDF for the duration of the pre-infectious state evaluated at the time already 
spent by individual  in that state, and so on.x  
Transmission dynamics 
Over any  time unit, susceptible individuals  of any age  within each household tΔ i h  
move from  to  based on an individual-specific instantaneous force of infection that isS E  
the sum of   due to contacts within the household and  due to extra-householdλ λ  
contacts: 
w λi,t,x = β N −1t,h







P ,t,h′ C,t,h′ S,t,h′  
where   is the probability of infection per contact between a susceptible and infectiousβ  
person, is the relative infectiousness of asymptomatic infections, compared to casesf  
that do develop symptoms,  is the mean per-capita intra-household contact rate,w  
assuming random mixing within the household.  is the contact matrix outside theU  
household for the total number of contacts made between individuals aged i with 
individuals aged j.  denotes individuals within the household itself, while denotesh h′  
individuals in the population excluding the household itself). , , and  representIP ,t IC,t IS,t  
the total number of infectious individuals not in quarantine at time .t  
We assume that all individuals within the household make one contact per day, and                           
calculate the expected population-wide intra-household contact matrix where is             W    W ij    
the sum of all aged individuals aged living together with household members of age ,              i               j  
divided by the model population size aged . We ensure that the average contact rates are              i                  
such that the total number of extra-household contacts are symmetric between                     
age-groups, and calculate the population-level contact matrix,  .Z = W + U  
The basic reproduction number   is then defined as the average number of secondaryR0  
infections generated by a typical infected individual in a fully susceptible population, and 
is computed as the dominant eigenvalue of the next generation matrix (NGM) of the 
corresponding compartmental model structure to our IBM model, defined as: 
GM Z (y (d ) 1 )fd )N ij = β ij i P + dC + ( − yi S  
where accents indicate the expected (average) values. Lastly,  is the ratio of thisβ  
eigenvalue and the  value assumed in the simulation (see below).R0  
We validated the calculated  value through this method by running multiple iterationsR0  
of the model using a different seed for the random number generator, and calculating the 
average number of secondary cases derived from all infectious individuals who completed 
their period of infectiousness in the first 30 days of the simulation. 
Testing and lockdown 
We simulate an epidemic using a timestep of . The first round of mass testing ist dayΔ = 1  
introduced at time  when the prevalence of infectiousness in the model reaches atg  
predefined threshold (as observed in the pilot round of mass testing in the county). If 
introduced, the second and third rounds of testing are introduced on days andtg + 7  
.4tg + 1  
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When testing is introduced, we assume that any individual  attends mass-testing withx  






observed attendance for the test round introduced at time  ,  is the total modelt N eligible  
population size that is eligible for testing (any individual between the ages of 10 and 65), 
and is the proportion of the model population size that is in quarantine at timeP quarantine  
.t  
Individuals already in quarantine do not attend testing. We assume 100% sensitivity to 
detect an infectious individual (in state , , or ), 0% sensitivity to detect an infectedIP IS IC  
but not yet infectious individual (in state ), and 100% specificity for any individual notE  
currently infected. Those who test positive are assumed to comply with quarantine 
measures with probability , and any of their household members not alreadyCp  
quarantining are assumed to comply with probability . ​We also assume the sameCh  
probability  to quarantine individuals who do not attend mass-testing, but are eligibleCh  
(between the ages of 10 and 65). 
To implement scenarios with lockdown, we first calculated the effective reproduction 
number in the two weeks before the first round of mass-testing would be implemented, 
between  and . We then started a new model run using the same seed for the4tg − 1 tg  
random number generator, and implemented a lockdown scenario by changing the value 
for the probability of effective contact  from the time of implementation of lockdownβ  
with , where  is the estimated effective reproductive number in the periodβ* = β RE
RE* RE  
before lockdown and is the target value for the effective reproduction number afterRE*  
implementation of lockdown. We assumed the reduced  would remain in place for theβ*  
remainder of the simulation. 
Population structure 
We simulate a new population within each model iteration by combining estimates for the                           
2020 Slovak population size, household size by age, and the estimated number of daily                           
contacts made in the household per day. 
We simulated a population with target size by simulating new households until the              N              
sum of individuals in all households reached .N  
To simulate a household, we randomly sampled , the age of one individual living in the              i                  
new household, and drew a value for , the household size (ranging from 1 to 6) for those             Y                      
living in the household, from a multinomial distribution where the age-specific                     
distribution of household sizes as estimated in the 2011 Slovak census were used as                           
probabilities for the household size (Eurostat, 2020). 
We assumed that normalized age-specific at-home contact rates, , calculated as                W ij*      








We then sampled age-groups of household members from a multinomial      Y − 1                
distribution with age-specific probability of sampling age-group , , where              j   (j|i) pP = W ij* j    
is the probability of sampling any individual from age-group , following age-specificP j                     j      
UNWPP estimates for the population size (UNWPP, 2019). 
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The median average household size across all modelled populations is 3.7 (3.6-3.7). This is                           
slightly lower than the average household size across all age groups (4.0) as reported in                             
the 2011 Slovak household census (2020, Eurostat - Population by sex, age group, size of                             
household and NUTS 3 regions). Figure S5 compares other key model parameters for the                           
simulated populations with the empirical datasets used. Panel A compares the UNWPP                       
population distribution for Slovakija in 2020 with the median population distribution                     
across all simulated populations. A black area underneath the median population size                       
shows the 95% interval of estimates across all populations, but is not visible in the plot as                                 
there is barely any variability across simulated populations, due to the algorithm that was                           
used. 
Panel B compares the median household contact matrix across all simulated populations                       
to the synthetic at home contact matrix, where the synthetic matrix has been adjusted                           
with the UNWPP population size estimates to ensure symmetry in the total number of                           
contacts (i.e. total number of contacts of those aged i with j = total number of contacts of                                   
those aged j with i). We used the dominant eigenvalue of all matrices to select the matrix                                 
representing the median model matrix. The matrices are very similar, though there are                         
slightly less child-adult contacts in the median model matrix compared to the synthetic                         
matrix. The synthetic matrix is generated through extrapolation of contact surveys done in                         
the mid 2000s in other European countries, and may therefore not reflect actual                         
household contact patterns in Slovakia. In addition, the surplus of contacts in the                         
synthetic contact matrix could be due to inclusion of extra-household contacts occurring                       
at the home, which are not included in the model household contact matrix. 
Panel C compares the median contact matrix for contacts made outside of the household                           
used in the model, with the contact matrix for non-home contacts in the synthetic matrix                             
for Slovakija (adjusted to represent a change in contact patterns due to Covid-19                         
interventions). The model contact matrices have been made symmetric for the population                       
distribution used in the model, while the synthetic contact matrix has been made                         
symmetrical for the UNWPP 2020 Slovakija contact matrix, but are otherwise identical. As                         
these population distributions are very similar (Panel A), the contact matrices are as well. 
Parameter values 
The table below lists all parameter values used in the model 
 
Parameter  Description  Value  Source 
H   Number of households  See text  Computed within the model 
,  i j   Age strata in years (number of age strata = )  0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 
25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 
45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 
65-69, 70-74, 75+ 
n/a 
 pi   Proportion of people in each age stratum  Resampled within each model 
iteration 
(UNWPP, 2019) 
 mh   Mean household size  Resampled within each model 
iteration 
(Eurostat, 2020) 
 N   Total population size  78,000   Representative for a typical 
Slovak county 
 N h   Number of people in each household  Resampled within each model 
iteration 
(Eurostat, 2020) 
t  Δ   Time step for discrete-time simulation  1 day  n/a 
 dE   Latent period in days  ~ gamma(μ = 2.5, k = 4)    
 dP   Duration of pre-symptomatic infectiousness in days  ~ gamma(μ = 2.5, k = 4)    
 dC   Duration of symptomatic infectiousness in days  ~ gamma(μ = 2.5, k = 4)    
 . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
perpetuity. 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in(which was not certified by peer review)preprint 
The copyright holder for thisthis version posted December 4, 2020. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.12.02.20240648doi: medRxiv preprint 
 
Simulations 
We ran a total of 15 scenarios and 200 iterations for each: 
 
 
 dS   Duration of asymptomatic infectiousness in days  ~ gamma(μ = 5, k = 4)  Assumed to be the same as 
duration of total infectious 
period for clinical cases 
 yi   Probability of becoming a symptomatic case, if 
infected, for age group 
Age-dependent, as estimated in 
Davies et al. 
(Davies et al, 2020) 
 R0   Basic reproduction number  1.5  Assumption, based on EpiNow2 
estimates for 
 in time before testing 
 f   Relative infectiousness of asymptomatic cases  50%  Assumption 
 w   Within-household per-capita daily contact rate  1  Assumption 
 W   Age-dependent contact matrix inside the household Resampled within each model 
iteration 
(Prem, 2020; UNWPP, 2019; 
Eurostat, 2020) 
 U   Age-dependent contact matrix outside the 
household 
   (Prem, 2020) 
 β   Probability of transmission per contact with an 
infectious individual 
See text  Computed within the model 
 zt   Proportion of people eligible for testing who are 
tested 
As estimated in mass-testing 
(0.85, 0.78, 0.78) 
(Slovakia MOH, 2020) 
cp   Compliance with quarantine for those who test 
positive 
Variable: 0.0, 1.0  Assumption 
ch   Compliance with quarantine for household 
members of those who test positive 
Variable: 0.0, 1.0  Assumption 
 RE*   Target  after lockdownRE    Variable: 0.6, 1.0   Assumption 
 P E    Sensitivity of SARS-CoV-2 laboratory test among 
individuals in latent class 
0  Assumption 
 P P   Sensitivity of SARS-CoV-2 laboratory test among 
individuals in pre-symptomatic infectious class 
100%  Assumption 
 PC   Sensitivity of SARS-CoV-2 laboratory test among 
individuals in symptomatic infectious class 
100%  Assumption 
 P S   Sensitivity of SARS-CoV-2 laboratory test among 




Number of test rounds  Compliance household 
members ( ​) ch
  
1  N/A  0  N/A 
2  N/A  1  100% 
3  N/A  2  100% 
4  N/A  3  100% 
5  N/A  1  0% 
6  N/A  2  0% 
7  N/A  3  0% 
8  1  0  N/A 
9  1  1  100% 
10  1  2  100% 
11  1  3  100% 
12  1  1  0% 
13  1  2  0% 
14  1  3  0% 
15  0.6  0  N/A 
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